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Introduction
The COMM/ENT editors and staff are celebrating the twentieth
year of their journal's excellent service to the legal community. In
honor of the occasion, they have asked several of their supporters to
write about a current or future trend in the law of communications or
intellectual property. In that vein, I would like to comment on the
growing tendency of manufacturers to claim trade dress rights in the
appearance of their products as a means of insulating them from
competition from knock-offs, and more particularly, on some of the
United States Courts of Appeals' efforts during the past four years to
contain the practice. These courts-particularly the Third and Second
Circuits-have expressed skepticism about the legitimacy of such
claims in many instances. Moreover, they have voiced considerable
concern about the effect of liberal trade dress protection for product
features on competition and on the "federal right to copy," which
Congress created as a byproduct of the patent and copyright laws.
This article will evaluate the steps these courts have taken in
restricting the trade dress cause of action in light of these concerns
and explore their implications, particularly in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.1
U.S. law provides several means by which businesses may obtain
intellectual property rights in their products' features. First, they may
apply for a utility patent on useful, inventive aspects of the product,
or a design patent for ornamental aspects of its appearance. The
standards of patentability in either case, however, are difficult for
many product creators and designers to meet. The invention or
design must be novel 2-which means, for all practical purposes, that
the applicant was the first person to make it. Moreover, the invention
or design must be non-obviousa-if a person with ordinary skill in the
pertinent art and knowledge of previous inventions or designs in the
field would think the applicant's invention or design obvious in light
of the earlier ones, then that invention or design will not qualify for a
patent.4 It may be difficult to produce a design for a suitcase or a
disposable diaper or a tie for plastic bags that will be efficient and will
sell, but is a sufficient departure from the previous designs to be non-
obvious. Further, even if a patent is available, pursuing one may not
be feasible. Patents are expensive and they only provide protection
1. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1996).
4. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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once they are granted. The application process may last a couple of
years, and the commercial life of many consumer product designs is
not much longer than the application period.
Copyrights may be available for original "pictorial, graphic or
sculptural" works that are embodied in a useful article and mass
produced for general consumption.5 As a general matter, the
standards for copyright protection are lower than for patent
protection: the work must be "fixed" in a tangible form, and it must
be "original."'6 Originality is much easier to demonstrate than patent
law's novelty requirement: it merely requires that the work be the
author's own, and demonstrate a minimal level of creativity.7
However, copyright protection is further restricted when a "pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work" is embodied in a useful article, as is
frequently the case when manufacturers seek to prohibit others from
copying the appearance of their products. The copyright claimant
must demonstrate that the pictorial, graphic or sculptural elements of
the product are "physically or conceptually separable" from the
utilitarian aspects of the article.8 For example, the little statue of a
leaping jaguar on the hood of a Jaguar car is physically separable,
because it would be recognizable as a work of sculpture even if
severed from the car. However, most design elements of useful
articles are not physically separable, and conceptual separability is
much more difficult to prove. Under the leading test from the Second
Circuit, the copyright claimant seeking to prove conceptual
separability must demonstrate that the alleged copyrightable design
elements reflect the designer's artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences. 9 Since most designers of
useful articles merge form and function, they cannot satisfy this
standard.
Omitting protection for product features that are obvious or
non-novel, or that lack separability, was hardly an oversight on
Congress' part. The ultimate purpose of the federal intellectual
property scheme is to ensure a rich, diverse and competitive
marketplace. Congress enacted the patent and copyright laws to
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1996); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
7. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
8. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
9. See id. The separability requirement is imposed as a prerequisite to copyright
protection for useful articles in part to prevent businesses from using copyright protection




provide limited property rights in certain products of the intellect as
an incentive to create such products. This facilitates provision of a
variety of creative products to the public. However, Congress has
always seen patent and copyright protection as an exception to the
general rule that business competitors may freely copy one another's
products. Congress clearly believed that a competitive marketplace
requires free access to innovation, and intended for those creations
not qualifying for a patent or copyright, or whose copyright or patent
has expired, to remain in the public domain, to "be made and sold by
whoever chooses to do so.'1 As the Seventh Circuit has explained:
[I]mitation is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded
availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the normal
operation of supply and demand to yield the fair price society must
pay for a given commodity .... Copying is not only good, it is a
federal right-a necessary complement to the patent system's grant
of limited monopolies.
Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal
patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts within the
public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the
tools of creation available to all. They provide the baseline of
competition upon which the patent system's incentive to creative
effort depends.11
Congress intended, in the standards for protection set forth in
the Patent and Copyright Acts, to reach the optimal balance between
the goals of providing incentives to create and maintaining a broad
and vigorous public domain from which all may borrow. For years,
however, many American businesses have expressed dissatisfaction
with the balance Congress drew in the Patent and Copyright Acts,
arguing that they should have the means to prevent competitors from
manufacturing and selling knock-offs of those products that fail to
qualify for copyright or a patent. They have contended that this form
of free-riding is unfair, and places them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
foreign competitors.12 Bills to create such protection have been
introduced in Congress repeatedly over the past several decades, 13
10. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). See also Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
11. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996) (quoting American Safety Table Co., Inc. v. Schreiber, 269
F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), and Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156),
12. See, e.g., The Industrial Innovation and Technology Act, 1987: Hearings on S. 791
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 223 (1987).
13. See, e.g., H.R. 1790, 102d Cong. (1991). For a brief history of the attempts to
enact such legislation, see The Industrial Innovation and Technology Act, 1987: Hearings
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but Congress has declined to enact them. Presumably, on weighing
the resulting cost of such protection to consumers against the claimed
injury to businesses, Congress has determined that the existing
balance better promotes the overall good.
In recent years,-businesses have increasingly turned to the law of
unfair competition, and particularly to Lanham Act § 43(a), as a
possible alternative means of preventing competitors from copying
their products. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a cause of
action against a defendant for use of an unregistered trademark or
trade dress that causes a likelihood of consumer confusion about the
source, sponsorship, or approval of its goods. 14 The term "trade
dress" originally was understood to refer to'a product's labeling and
packaging, but the concept has been expanded to encompass those
physical features of the product itself that may serve to identify its
source.
15
Unlike the patent and copyright laws, the trademark and unfair
competition doctrines codified in § 43(a) were not intended to
provide property rights in a business' products, as such. Rather, their
purpose is to promote competition by ensuring that consumers can
rely on trademarks, trade dress, and other indicia of product origin to
distinguish the products of one supplier from those of others, and
thus exercise their purchasing preferences. When purchasers can
accurately rely on trademarks and trade dress to distinguish
on S. 791, supra note 12, at 223 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights);
David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road - A History of the Fight Over Industrial
Design Protection in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. OF U.S.A 21 (1997).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). Lanham Act § 43(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin... which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person.., shall be liable in a civil action by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.
15. See J.T. McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake,
59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 62 (1996). Throughout this essay, I will use the terms
"product feature trade dress" and "product configuration trade dress" interchangeably.
This form of trade dress may consist of one or a combination of physical features of a
product. It is to be contrasted with the packaging in which the product is sold (which I
refer to as "packaging trade dress"), and the verbal or graphic trademarks that appear on
the product's label. The product feature trade dress, packaging trade dress and verbal or
graphic trademarks may all serve the purpose of identifying the product's producer to
consumers and distinguishing the product from the products of other producers, and I
refer to all of them collectively as "indications of origin."
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competing products, they can reward producers for good quality
through repeat patronage. This, in turn, encourages businesses to
provide good quality products, and promotes competition. If a
defendant copies the plaintiff's trademark or trade dress, this may
deceive consumers, leading them to purchase the defendant's goods
when they meant to purchase the plaintiff's. In such cases, the
purchaser is deprived of the good he or she wanted, the plaintiff is
deprived of the benefit of its good reputation, and its incentive to
provide quality is undercut.16
Business plaintiffs have increasingly argued that consumers
identify and distinguish the goods of one competitor from those of
others not only through the parties' trademarks and product
packaging, but also through the appearance of the parties' products.
Thus, if competitors are permitted to copy the appearance of the
plaintiff's product, consumers may be confused, believing that the
defendant's product comes from the plaintiff, or is somehow affiliated
with or sponsored by the plaintiff, when it is not. Consumers will
purchase a product they did not mean to purchase, and the plaintiff
will lose sales and risk possible injury to its business reputation by
virtue of consumers' mistaken association. This is the very sort of
injury Lanham Act § 43(a) is meant to prevent.
However, permitting plaintiffs to rely on § 43(a) to prevent the
copying of product features creates a distinct tension with Congress'
plan in enacting the patent and copyright laws. If the courts readily
accept the plaintiffs' arguments and enjoin the copying, the plaintiffs
may be able to avoid the rigors of competition with knock-offs,
without the necessity of satisfying the difficult novelty and non-
obviousness standards imposed by patent law, or the separability
requirement imposed by copyright law. This, in turn, may stifle the
robust marketplace competition that Congress intended to maintain
in imposing those standards and relegating product designs that are
unable to meet the standards to the public domain. It may, in effect,
undercut the federal right to copy.17
As the number of § 43(a) product copying cases has escalated in
recent years, courts have expressed growing concern about their
capacity to undercut the careful balance Congress reached in the
Patent and Copyright Acts, and their general anticompetitive
potential. In just the past four years, some of the Circuit Courts of
16. Park 'N Fly, Inc: v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). See also
Trademarks-Registration and Protection, S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong. 1-17 (1946).
17. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Appeals-particularly the Second and Third Circuits-have taken
decisive steps to attempt to ensure that the use of § 43(a) to prohibit
the copying of product features does not become excessive. Review
of the decisions suggests a couple of underlying currents of thought.
The opinions suggest a strong sense that, in the § 43(a) context,
product features are inherently different from other indicia of.
origin-marks, trade names and packaging trade dress-and that this
difference may dictate a different set of standards for recognizing
Lanham Act rights and deciding infringement claims. Product
features are inherently different for two reasons. First, the pool of
usable product features is likely to be considerably smaller than the
pool of potential word or symbol marks or packaging trade dress.
Thus, granting a manufacturer rights in a product feature is likely to
have a more detrimental impact on its competitors than is the case
when rights are recognized in other indicia of origin. For example,
there may be an unlimited number of combinations of colors, words,
symbols, designs and other elements available for adoption in a
product's packaging. By contrast, there are only a limited number of
shapes a producer can adopt for a disposable diaper, a park bench, or
a tie for plastic bags that will allow the article to function effectively
and be efficient to manufacture. Thus, allowing one producer to claim
rights in a particular shape, for example, may have a far greater
impact on that producer's competitors than finding that it has rights
in the packaging it employs for the product.' 8
Second, while marks and product packaging are generally
understood to represent consumer approbation and loyalty to the
producer of a satisfactory product, it may be unclear whether features
of the product itself represent consumer good will for the producer or
for the product itself. Lanham Act § 43(a) was only intended to
secure good will for the producer as the source of the product.' 9
Indeed, the courts have evidenced considerable skepticism for the
proposition that consumers in fact rely on product features as an
indication of product origin in most cases. They have suggested that
the legitimate purposes of Lanham Act § 43(a) can be adequately
effectuated in most cases by enforcing rights in marks and packaging,
without resort to features of the product itself.20
18. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d
Cir. 1997).
19. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp., 65 F.3d at 658-59.
20. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 379; Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co., 50
F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995).
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There are three requirements that must be satisfied in a § 43(a)
trade dress infringement case: 1) the plaintiff's trade dress must be
distinctive (that is, it must communicate or be likely to communicate
the origin of the product to consumers); 2) the trade dress must be
non-functional; and 3) the defendant's use of a similar trade dress
must lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion about the source,
affiliation or sponsorship of the parties' goods.21 The courts
developed the non-functionality requirement to ensure that trade
dress rights do not unduly encroach on free competition. However,
when trade dress claims involve product features, some of the
Circuits have refused to rely solely on the non-functionality
requirement to maintain the proper competitive balance. Rather,
they have reformulated both of the other substantive requirements to
take greater account of competition concerns. In exploring the steps
the Circuit Courts have taken, it is useful to begin with an
examination of the non-functionality requirement. Thus, Part I
provides an overview of the functionality doctrine, then Parts II and
III examine the recent decisions relating to the distinctiveness and
likelihood of confusion issues, respectively. This article concludes,
among other things, that to the extent greater competitive concerns
exist in § 43(a) product configuration cases, the Second and Third
Circuits' approach can be justified. That approach applies the
functionality requirement to exclude the most competitively
important product features from protection, and then subjects
competitively significant, but less important product features to a
secondary meaning requirement as a prerequisite for protection. This
may provide better results than would be obtained by imposing a
more stringent functionality requirement to exclude all competitively
significant design features from protection, as may be done in the
Eighth Circuit. This article also concludes that judicial emphasis on
label marks and product packaging, rather than product configuration
similarities in evaluating the likelihood of confusion is sensible, but
may be circumvented through pre- and post-sale confusion
arguments.
21. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir. 1995). The
burden of proving these elements is on the § 43(a) plaintiff, except, in some circuits, the
burden of proof regarding functionality is on the defendant. See 3 J.T. MCCARTHY,




The functionality doctrine provides the most direct means of
preventing application of § 43(a) in a manner that undercuts
Congress' competitive plan under the Patent and Copyright Acts. In a
recent opinion, the Supreme Court described the functionality
doctrine as follows:
"In general terms, a product feature is functional," and cannot
serve as a trademark, "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article, or if it affects the cost or quality of the article," that is, if
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage.22
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control
a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a
monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time,
after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a
product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however,
a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to
whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever(because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity). 23
The Supreme Court's focus on "useful" or "utilitarian" product
features reflects the general understanding that competitors usually
have a greater legitimate need to copy unpatented utilitarian features
of a product than they have to copy features that are simply
decorative. While consumers may identify certain utilitarian product
features with a particular producer, and view their presence in a
product as an indication that the product comes from that producer,
the law will tolerate this potential for confusion because the injury to
free competition that would result from granting the producer
protection from copying would constitute an even greater harm.24
When "non-utilitarian" features are at issue, a different balance may
be struck. Because prohibiting copying has a lesser impact on
competition, the potential consumer confusion may be viewed as the
greater harm, justifying trade dress protection.
The Supreme Court's description of the functionality doctrine
also suggests the possibility that not all useful or utilitarian product
22. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
23. Id. at 164.
24. See, e.g., In re Deister Concentrator Inc., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
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features must fall under the functionality prohibition. Presumably,
some product features, while playing a utilitarian role in the product,
may not be "essential to the use or purpose of the article," or "affect
the cost or quality of the article." This may be the case if there are
numerous alternative features that would accomplish the same useful
function without significantly increasing the cost or decreasing the
quality of the product. Granting trade dress rights in such cases may
not have an unduly detrimental impact on competitors.
Both the "useful/non-useful" and "not all useful features"
qualifications suggested in the Supreme Court's description have lead
to difficulties in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. With regard to the
latter, the Circuits have devised a variety of tests to determine which
"useful" features will be excluded from trade dress protection. In a
1982 decision, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that
while a product feature may be de facto functional because it is
directed to performance of a function, it need not necessarily be
deemed de jure functional, and excluded from trade dress protection.
The court suggested that the categorization should turn on the effect
of protection on competition. The effect on competition will depend
in large part upon the availability of equally effective and cost-
efficient alternatives.25 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals'
approach has been influential in the regional Circuit Courts.
However, a general "availability of alternatives" approach to
limiting § 43(a) product configuration trade dress claims may draw
the lines between competition and protection differently-and more
favorably to those seeking to prevent copying-in some cases than
Congress intended when it drafted the patent laws. An example of
this can be found in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp.26 In that case the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found it necessary to impose an additional prerequisite to
trade dress protectibility. In Vornado, the plaintiff had obtained a
utility patent for its household fan, claiming a certain spiral grill
configuration as one element of the invention. The plaintiff marketed
a commercial version of its patented fan, and subsequently brought a
§ 43(a) trade dress infringement action seeking to prohibit the
defendant from marketing a household fan featuring a similar spiral
grill. The defendant's fan did not infringe plaintiff's patent because it
lacked other elements of the plaintiff's patented combination. The
district court granted § 43(a) relief, finding that the spiral grill design
25. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
26. 58 F.3d 1498 (10thCir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 753 (1996).
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was non-functional because there were numerous other grill
configurations available that would disperse the air just as effectively.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
providing trade dress protection for product configurations that are
claimed in utility patents may directly interfere with the public's
ability to practice patented inventions once their patents expire. In
the court's view, the interest in making expired patented inventions
available to competitors outweighed the interest in preventing
consumer confusion in such cases. Thus, the court augmented the
functionality requirement, holding that:
[although a product configuration must be nonfunctional in order to
be protected as trade dress . . . , not every nonfunctional
configuration is eligible for that protection. Where a product
configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention
covered by a utility patent, so that without it the invention cannot
fairly be said to be the same invention, patent policy dictates that it
enter into the public domain when the utility patent [expires. To
ensure that result, it cannot receive trade dress protection ....
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in dictum, has
expressed general agreement with the Tenth Circuit's reasoning.28
Courts' dissatisfaction with results under the "availability of
alternatives" approach to the functionality doctrine may also have
contributed to recent decisions heightening the distinctiveness and
likelihood of confusion standards to take greater account of
competition interests as will be discussed below.29
The distinction between useful and "non-useful" or decorative
product features has also troubled the Circuit Courts, because in
some instances competitors appear legitimately to need to copy
strictly decorative features of a product in order to compete
effectively. This consideration led to creation of the highly
controversial "aesthetic functionality" doctrine, which in its more
acceptable form, is exemplified in the Second Circuit's opinion in
Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.3°
27. Id. at 1500.
28. Thomas & Betts Corp., 65 F.3d at 659-60. The Seventh Circuit has itself
subsequently characterized its discussion of Vornado as dicta. Thomas & Betts Corp. v.
Panduit Corp., 1998 WL 89626 (7th Cir. 1998).
29. The Third and Eighth Circuits' standards for functionality, described at infra
notes 33 and 88 and accompanying text, may be intended in part to address this concern as
well.
30. 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990). In Wallace, the plaintiff claimed trade dress rights in
the baroque style for silverware, which featured ornate patterns of flowers, roots, scrolls
and curls along the shaft of the silverware. The Court of Appeals found that though the
baroque style did not contribute to the useful function of silverware (i.e., it did not "affect
the use of the silverware" or "contribute to its efficient manufacture"), the style should
19981
There the court held that "where an ornamental feature is claimed as
a trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder
competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative designs, the
aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection." 31
While some of the Circuits have questioned the soundness of an
aesthetic functionality doctrine, as such,32 some of them have adopted
tests for functionality that are sufficiently flexible to permit a finding
that a decorative product feature is functional when it appears
necessary to do so in the interest of competition. For example, the
Third Circuit has determined that a product feature will be deemed
functional if it is "significantly related to the utilitarian function of
the product, 3 3 but has retained flexibility in defining the utilitarian
function of the product. In Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc.,
the court defined the utilitarian purpose of the product at issue-an
outdoor lighting fixture with a modernistic design-as not only to
provide light but also to blend in with the architectural design of
building exteriors. The design configuration at issue was particularly
well adapted to contemporary building designs. Thus, even though
the appearance of the fixture could be deemed ornamental (it had no
apparent bearing on the mechanical operation of the light, or the ease
of its manufacture), it could nonetheless be deemed significantly
related to the utilitarian function of the product under the Third
Circuit's standard, and thus functional. 34
nonetheless be deemed de jure functional. There was a large market for baroque style
silverware, which competitors would be excluded from serving if the plaintiff were found
to have trade dress rights in that style. The style was thus essential to effective
competition.
The "less acceptable," or more controversial approach to aesthetic functionality
can be found in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,
343 (9th Cir. 1952):
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the
product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a
patent or copyright. On the other hand, where the feature ... is a mere arbitrary
embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of
identification and individuality, and hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in
connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite
showing of secondary meaning is made.
The Ninth Circuit has since retreated from this standard. See First Brands Corp. v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1378 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the Pagliero test seems to
have influenced the Eighth Circuit's functionality standard, which is discussed in the text
accompanying note 88, infra.
31. Wallace, 916 F.2d at 81 (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Scicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984);
American Greeting Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
33. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
34. Id. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir.
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Each Circuit has developed its own formulation of the
functionality doctrine and continues to refine it as new circumstances
are presented. Each formulation strives to provide flexibility to
review the specific facts of a case with a pragmatic eye, and prohibit
trade dress claims that would have a particularly anti-competitive
impact. It has been argued that because the courts created the non-
functionality doctrine specifically to prohibit unduly anti-competitive
uses of § 43(a), and to avoid uses of § 43(a) that undermine the
limitations of patent law, concerns about these matters should be
confined to consideration of the functionality issue, and should not be
carried over to influence development of the other elements of the §
43(a) trade dress cause of action.35 However, as will be discussed
more fully below, the trend in the past three years has been in the
opposite direction, suggesting that the courts will not
compartmentalize competition concerns in that fashion.
II
The Distinctiveness Issue
The purpose of § 43(a) trade dress protection is to prevent
competitors from engaging in acts that lead to a likelihood of
consumer confusion about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of
their products. If consumers view a plaintiff's non-functional product
configuration as an indication that the product comes from the
plaintiff, then a competitor's use of a similar configuration in its own
product may confuse consumers, leading them to think that the
competitor's product comes from the plaintiff, or at least is somehow
sponsored by or affiliated with the plaintiff. The distinctiveness
element of the § 43(a) cause of action is meant to ensure that
consumers are in fact likely to view the plaintiff's product feature as
an indication of the product's origin before protection is afforded.
1987). There, the court stated:
[W]e adopt a test whose focus is the effect on competition . . . . If [a] feature
must be slavishly copied in order to have an equally functional product, then the
feature is not entitled to protection. But if the feature enables the second-comer
simply to market his product more effectively, it is entitled to protection.
This interpretation does not limit functional features to those essential to a
product's operation. Because a function of certain products is aesthetic appeal, a
feature intrinsic to the aesthetic appeal of those products may not be entitled to
trademark protection.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 505-07 (1997).
1998]
Trade dress may either be "inherently distinctive" or merely
"capable of becoming distinctive." As a general matter, product
feature trade dress will be deemed inherently distinctive if it seems
likely that consumers will automatically assume that the feature
indicates the product's origin. If the product configuration is not
inherently distinctive, but is merely capable of becoming distinctive,
it can only be protected as trade dress if its claimant can demonstrate
that it has become distinctive through acquisition of "secondary
meaning." This entails a showing that, as the result of extensive
exposure to the configuration through sales and advertising,
consumers have come to view the presence of the feature as an
indication that the product comes from a particular source.36
The traditional approach to evaluating the inherent
distinctiveness of trademarks is set forth in Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
v. Hunting World, Inc.3 7 In that case, Judge Friendly recognized four
categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2)
descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary arid fanciful. These
categorizations essentially reflect the relationship of the alleged mark
to the product or service it is meant to identify. Generic words and
symbols constitute the common name of the product or service itself,
and thus are incapable of differentiating one producer of the product
or service from another. Thus, words and symbols in the generic
category can never be protected as marks.38
Marks in the "descriptive" category describe the product or its
geographical origin (e.g., "Crunchy" cookies or "California" fume
blanc). Consumers may not automatically think that such words or
symbols indicate the producer of the product, so they are deemed
merely capable of indicating origin. They can only be protected on a
showing of secondary meaning.39
The last two of Judge Friendly's categories constitute inherently
distinctive marks, and can be protected without a showing of
secondary meaning. Suggestive marks contain only an indirect
description of the product, such as "Greyhound" for bus services.
Arbitrary marks consist of words or symbols bearing no descriptive
relationship to the product, such as "Diamond" as a mark for nuts, or
"Tea Rose" as a mark for flour. Fanciful marks consist of words or
symbols which were created for the occasion, such as "Kyo-450" ball
36. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
37. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
38. See id.
39. See id.
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bearings or "Kleenex" tissues, and thus have no other meaning at all.
In each case, it is assumed that consumers will automatically attach
origin-indicating significance to the mark, because there is no other
apparent reason for it to appear on or in connection with the product
or service.40
Particularly in the case of abstract design marks and marks
consisting of a combination of elements, courts have augmented the
Abercrombie & Fitch classification system with the Seabrook Foods
test, which asks whether the design or combination of elements is
commonplace or ordinary in the industry.41 If so, consumers are
unlikely to assume that the alleged mark is meant to distinguish the
goods of one producer from those of others in the industry, and a
showing of secondary meaning will be required in order to satisfy the
distinctiveness requirement. If the design or combination of elements
is unique, by contrast, consumers will be more likely to attach origin-
indicating significance, and the alleged mark will be deemed
inherently distinctive.
A. The Two Pesos Decision
Prior to 1992, some of the Circuit Courts of Appeals had held
that § 43(a) plaintiffs claiming rights in trade dress must demonstrate
secondary meaning in all cases, effectively rejecting an "inherently
distinctive" status for § 43(a) trade dress claimants.42 In 1992, in the
Two Pesos case, the Supreme Court rejected this requirement.43 The
Court reasoned that the language of § 43(a) made no distinction
between trade dress and other indications of origin, and that there
was no apparent reason to differentiate the various types of
indications of origin in this manner, or to differentiate registered and
unregistered indications of origin.' This liberal decision has
undoubtedly encouraged producers to turn to § 43(a) as a means of
preventing competitors from copying their products and packaging.
The Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos involved a § 43(a)
claim that the defendant had infringed the trade dress of a restaurant.
The district court had defined the plaintiff's trade dress as "the total
40. See id.
41. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1977).
42. See, e.g., Murphy v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1990);
American Greetings, 807 F.2d 1136; Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986).
43. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
44. For purpose of registration, the Lanham Act subjects trade dress to the same
distinctiveness rules as other indications of origin. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1996).
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image of the business [including] the shape and general appearance of
the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen
floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food, the
servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on the total image of
the restaurant."45 The Supreme Court did not directly address
possible differences between this kind of trade dress, product
packaging trade dress, or product feature trade dress. Nor did it
undertake to determine how courts should determine whether trade
dress is inherently distinctive or merely capable of becoming
distinctive.
B. The Aftermath of Two Pesos
In the aftermath of Two Pesos, several Circuit Courts of Appeal
have undertaken to determine the appropriate standard ' for
evaluating the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress. With regard to
product packaging trade dress, they have had relatively little
difficulty. An illustrative case is the Second Circuit's opinion in
Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc.4 6 There, the
court noted that producers have a virtually unlimited array of
lettering styles, words, symbols, colors, shapes, and designs to choose
from, and that a producer's particular combination of these elements
in its product packaging was likely to be "arbitrary" or "fanciful"
within the meaning of the Abercrombie & Fitch hierarchy, and thus
inherently distinctive. The court observed that exceptions to inherent
distinctiveness are only likely to arise when the claimant packages its
product in a manner that is customary in a particular industry (for
example, packaging lemon-lime sodas in green containers), or when
the overall impact of the combined features of the claimant's
packaging is to describe the product (for example, when the overall
impression conveyed by the packaging for car wax is a gleaming car).
The Circuit Courts' approaches in the case of product
configuration trade dress, however, have differed. Perhaps the most
controversial approach can be found in the Third Circuit's opinion in
Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.47 In Duraco, the
§ 43(a) plaintiff alleged trade dress rights in its plastic planter styled
like a Grecian urn, seeking to enjoin a competitor from marketing a
planter with similar shape and texture. The plaintiff claimed that the
design features of its planter were "suggestive" of the product, within
45. Two Pesos, 505 US. at 765 n.1.
46. 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993).
47. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
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the Abercrombie & Fitch framework, and thus were inherently
distinctive. The Third Circuit responded by finding the Abercrombie
& Fitch classification scheme irrelevant in the case of product
configurations.48
The Third Circuit reasoned that a product's configuration differs
fundamentally from its trademark or packaging because it is not a
symbol that identifies the product. Rather it is the product itself. It
thus has no dialectical relationship to the product which allows one to
say that it is "suggestive" or "descriptive" of the product, or
"arbitrary" or "fanciful" in relation to it.49 Moreover, while one can
assume that consumers will understand that the purpose of an
arbitrary word or symbol appearing on the product's label or
packaging is to identify the source of the product (why else would it
appear there?), one cannot generally assume that consumers will
understand product features to serve that purpose. They may assume
that the features are present simply to enhance the appeal of the
product.5" The Duraco court also noted that product configurations
differ from marks and packaging in another important way: because
the pool of available product features is generally much less extensive
than the pool of available marks and product packaging designs,
recognition of exclusive rights in a particular feature is much more
likely to hinder competition.51
The court concluded that while product feature trade dress may
be deemed inherently distinctive, this finding should only be made
when there is a high probability that the product configuration serves
a "virtually exclusively identifying function for consumers;" when
concerns over "theft" of an identifying feature and the cost to an
enterprise of gaining and proving secondary meaning outweigh
concerns over inhibiting competition; and where consumers are
especially likely to perceive a connection between the product's
configuration and its source.52 The Duraco court then stated a three-
part test for determining when a product configuration-comprising a
product feature or some particular combination or arrangement of
product features-can be deemed inherently distinctive. The
configuration must be: (i) unusual and memorable; (ii) conceptually
48. Id. at 1439. The court defined "product configuration," for purposes of its
decision, as referring to "trade dress alleged in the product itself, whether in a specific
feature or in some combination or arrangement of features." Id.
49. Id. at 1440-41.
50. See id. at 1441.
51. Id. at 1448.
52. Id. at 1448-49.
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separable from the product; and (iii)likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product.53
The "unusual" requirement, set forth in part (i), merely reflects
the generally accepted standard of inherent distinctiveness set forth
in Seabrook Foods.54 The "memorable" requirement, while new,
seems a sensible limitation-if consumers are unlikely to remember
the product feature, they are unlikely to rely on it as an indication of
source in future purchases. Thus, there is no need automatically to
extend trade dress protection for the feature, without a
demonstration of secondary meaning.
The conceptual separability requirement, set forth in part (ii) of
the Duraco test, is new both in nomenclature and reach. The court
explained that under this provision, the "product configuration must,
at least conceptually, be 'something other than, and separate from,
the merchandise.' . . . [It must appear to the consumer to act as an
independent signifier of origin rather than as a component of the
good."55 This suggests that product features may never serve dual
functions as a component of the good and as an indication of origin.
With regard to part (iii) of its test, the Duraco court elaborated:
"[i]f the configuration itself, separate from the product, is likely to
serve some substantial purpose other than as a designation of
origin-that is, besides to set it apart from other sources' products in
consumers' minds-then it cannot be inherently distinctive .... 256
Part (iii) thus seems to build on the conceptual separability
requirement, providing that the' conceptually separate product
configuration must serve no substantial function other than to
indicate origin. The court noted that the producer's intent in adopting
the, particular configuration would be highly probative. For example,
an intent to decorate the product in adopting the particular feature
would tend to negate inherent distinctiveness.
The Duraco court reasoned that if a product feature is likely to
be desirable to consumers for some reason other than its indication
that the product comes from a particular source, as a matter of policy
it should not be removed from competitors' reach absent a showing
of secondary meaning. The court acknowledged that its "primary
source-indicating" inquiry was motivated by the same concerns that
53. Id.
54. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
55. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449-50 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492 (C.C.D. Mass.
1886)).
56. Id. at 1450.
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motivate the functionality inquiry: "[bloth are intended to protect
competition-and hence consumers-by restricting the types of
product features that may be insulated from copying."57 The Duraco
Court's test for inherent distinctiveness appears to eliminate more
product features in the name of competition than does its
functionality standard. A product feature will be eliminated for
functionality in the Third Circuit if it is "significantly related to the
utilitarian function of the product. '5 8 It will be eliminated for lack of
inherent distinctiveness, under Duraco, if it appears to play any
significant purpose other than to indicate the product's origin. Of
course, while a finding of functionality disqualifies a product feature
from § 43(a) protection altogether, a finding that the feature lacks
inherent distinctiveness does not altogether preclude § 43(a)
protection: the non-inherently distinctive product feature may still
receive § 43(a) protection if its user is able to demonstrate acquisition
of secondary meaning.59
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has likewise
emphasized that both the functionality requirement and the inherent
distinctiveness determination must reflect the special competition
concerns that product configuration claims present.60 The Second
57. Id. at 1451. In highlighting the Duraco court's emphasis on competitive concerns
in shaping its test for inherent distinctiveness, I do not mean to suggest that courts have
never entertained concerns about competition in this context before. Indeed, concerns for
competition undoubtedly contributed to the rule (later reversed in Two Pesos) that trade
dress claims must always be supported by a showing of secondary meaning. See, e.g.,
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, Inc., 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984). Moreover,
the Abercrombie & Fitch system of mark classification was motivated to some extent by
concerns for competition. The understanding that competitors legitimately needed to use
generic and descriptive terms in marketing their goods has always played a role in
justifying a denial of rights in generic marks, and a requirement of secondary meaning for
descriptive marks. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 4; A.J. Canfield v.
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1986); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc.,
781 F.2d 604,609 (7th Cir. 1986). I would not go so far as Professor Dratler, however, who
characterizes the Abercrombie & Fitch classification system as "nothing other than a
categorization of the number of unconstrained alternatives" available to competitors. Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations: Is There a Conflict with
Patent Policy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 492 (1996). Considerations other than concerns for
competition helped to shape the Abercrombie & Fitch classifications.
58. Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 825. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
59. The Third Circuit may not be overly receptive to claims of secondary meaning in
such cases, however. As will be discussed in the next section, in addition to heightening
the standard for inherent distinctiveness, the Third Circuit has recently heightened the
standard for infringement in product configuration cases.
60. Landscape Forms, Inc., 113 F.3d at 379-80.
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Circuit has also expressed skepticism regarding claims that consumers
rely on product features as source indicators. 61
In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd.,62 the Second Circuit
undertook to determine whether the decorative autumn leaf and
squirrel designs on the plaintiff's children's sweaters constituted
inherently distinctive trade dress. The court agreed with the Third
Circuit that the Abercrombie & Fitch distinctiveness classifications
were inappropriate for product features, noting that application of
these classifications "would have the unwelcome, and likely
unintended, result of treating a class of product features as
'inherently distinctive,' and thus eligible for trade dress protection,
even though they were never intended to serve a source-identifying
function." 63 However, while the court admittedly followed the
Duraco court's reasoning regarding the distinctions between product
features and product packaging, and the potentially anticompetitive
effects of liberal protection of product feature trade dress, it declined
to adopt the Duraco three-part test for determining the inherent
distinctiveness of product features. This was because the Third
Circuit's test was "not rooted in the language of the Lanham Act.''64
Rather, the Second Circuit stated that the test for inherent
distinctiveness of product feature trade dress should be "whether the
feature is likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the
product. ' 65 In making this determination, the court gave particular
emphasis to the intent of the producer in adopting the feature.
According to the court, the producer's primary intent must have been
to indicate the origin of the product, not to accomplish some other
purposes, such as to make the product more aesthetically pleasing.
The court suggested that the primary purpose of most product
features or designs is functional or aesthetic, not source-indicating,
and that consumers generally will understand product features to
serve other purposes than source identification.66 The court made it
clear that it would be disinclined to find product features inherently
distinctive as a general matter. Indeed, more recently, it has directly
61. Id.
62. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. Id. at 1007.
64. Id. at 1008 n.6.
65. Id. at 1008.
66. Id. Other factors the court has suggested are relevant include whether the design
is unusual in the field, or is a common, basic shape or design, or a mere refinement on a
commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods.
Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 378,378 n.3.
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acknowledged that it is "moving toward a rule that packaging is
usually indicative of a product's source, while the design or
configuration of the product is usually not so." 67 In Knitwaves, the
Second Circuit readily found that the plaintiff's primary intent in
adding the. leaf and squirrel motifs to its children's sweaters was
aesthetic, not source-indicating. The court thus denied relief against
the defendant's copying, in the absence of secondary meaning.
The Second Circuit's emphasis on the producer's intent has been
criticized as "transforming a test of consumer association into one of
producer intent. '68 However, the producer's intent is relevant
circumstantial evidence of the product feature's likely impact on
consumers. A rule that made the producer's intent the only relevant
factor would be problematic because a feature intended by the
producer to be decorative may nonetheless indicate source to
consumers. However, the Second Circuit has held that other factors
are relevant in determining inherent distinctiveness. 69 The court's
emphasis on the intent factor over others may reflect the court's
perception that producers are asserting claims that their product
features are source-indicating as an afterthought-attempting to
transform § 43(a) into a serviceable substitute for a patent or
copyright.70
67. Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 379.
68. Dinwoodie, supra note 35, at 544. See also Dratler, supra note 57, at 481-82. It
has also been suggested that the finding regarding intent will turn on the producer's self-
serving testimony about its subjective intent. Dinwoodie, supra note 35, at 547. However,
objective evidence, such as typical practices of designers in the field, may also be relevant
as circumstantial evidence of the producer of an alleged product configuration trade
dress' intent.
69. See Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 378, 378 n.3. In Landscape Forms, the Second
Circuit reiterated that the ultimate inquiry is "whether the design [is] likely to be
understood as an indicator of the product's source." The court also explained that the
Seabrook Foods test, which asks whether the design is a common basic shape or design or
is unique or unusual in a particular field, would also be a relevant inquiry. The court
concluded: "a manufacturer's subjective intentions may be probative of whether its dress
is likely to indicate product source. But, as suggested by Seabrook, objective consideration
of the product and its similarity to others on the market will always be relevant and often
decisive." Id. at 378 n.3.
70. See Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 373. The Second Circuit has also recently
stressed the need for product feature trade dress claimants to define their alleged
inherently distinctive trade dress concretely and specifically, in order to avoid
anticompetitively overbroad protection, and has distinguished between unprotectible
trade dress concepts (which cannot be protected under § 43(a) because anticompetitively
overbroad) and specific expressions of such concepts (which can be protective if
distinctive). Id. at 381-82; Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27
(2d Cir. 1995).
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Other Circuits, while not directly undertaking to determine the
standard for inherent distinctiveness in product configuration cases,
have expressed some sympathy for the Third and Second Circuits'
approach. For example, in the Thomas & Betts case,71 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted the inherent differences
between product feature trade dress and other indications of origin,
and stated its assumption that a key purpose of the inherent
distinctiveness determination is to protect competition.72 The Seventh
Circuit echoed the Third Circuit's discussion in Duraco: "when
competitors are barred from duplicating features whose value to
consumers is intrinsic and not exclusively as a signifier of source,
competition is unduly hindered. 73
Similarly, in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,74 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed:
Insofar as product configurations are fundamentally different
from trademarks and trade dress, there is some question whether a
product configuration can ever be deemed "inherently distinctive."
Unlike traditional trademarks and trade dress, which function
primarily to identify the source of a given product, the primary
purpose of product configuration is not identification. Accordingly,
as the Third Circuit stated, "one cannot automatically conclude
from a product feature or configuration-as one can from a
product's arbitrary name, for example-that, to a consumer, it
functions primarily to denote the product's source. '" 75
The Fifth Circuit went on to voice concern about the "finite
competitive variations" that are available in the case of product
configurations, and the potential impact on competition.
76
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
emphatically rejected any difference in the test for inherent
distinctiveness of packaging and product feature trade dress. In Stuart
Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp.,77 the district court had adopted a test
that product configuration trade dress must be "memorable or
71. Thomas & Bets Corp., 65 F.3d at 654.
72. Id. at 658.
73. Id. at 657 (emphasis added). The Thomas & Betts court also discussed some of
the implications of the "differentness" of product feature trade dress for making a
satisfactory showing of secondary meaning.
74. 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997).
75. Id. at 252-53 (quoting Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441 (footnotes omitted)).
76. Id. at 253 n.9. The court found it unnecessary to decide "the controversial
question" whether product configurations can ever be considered inherently distinctive
because, "assuming arguendo" that the plaintiff's product configuration could not be
deemed inherently distinctive, the district court had not erred in concluding that it had
acquired secondary meaning.
77. 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
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striking" in order to be inherently distinctive. The Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Abercrombie & Fitch classification system
was the appropriate standard to apply. It elaborated that the
Abercrombie & Fitch approach to determining inherent
distinctiveness examines either: 1) the relationship between the
alleged trade dress and the product; or, in conjunction with Seabrook,
2) the relationship between the alleged trade dress and other trade
dress in the same field of product. However, there was no precedent
for focusing on the trade dress's "impact on consumers." 78
The Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the Duraco test (which
measures the trade dress' likely impact on consumers) as contrary to
the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos. The Eighth Circuit read
Two Pesos to rest "on a presumption that 'trade dress' is a single
concept that encompasses both product configuration and
packaging." 79  Thus,. to differentiate between the two was
inappropriate. In addition, the Eighth Circuit read the Two Pesos
decision as approving the Abercrombie & Fitch approach to
evaluating the inherent distinctiveness of trade dress.80
Finally, the Eighth Circuit argued that a test for inherent
distinctiveness that focused on likely impact on consumers and
memorableness was inappropriate because it would bear a very close
resemblance to the standard for secondary meaning: A showing of
secondary meaning requires empirical proof of consumer recognition
and identification, but a "likely impact on consumers" test would
merely shift the focus from actual consumer recognition to likely
consumer recognition. This would undermine Two Pesos, which held
that courts may not condition protection of inherently distinctive
marks on a showing of secondary meaning.8'
The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is open to some criticism. First, it
is hard to accept an assertion that there is no precedent for focusing
78. Id. at 786-87.
79. Id. at 787.
80. In Duraco, the Third Circuit distinguished Two Pesos on the ground that it did
not directly address the inherent distinctiveness of product configuration trade dress. The
Eighth Circuit considered and rejected this argument, finding the restaurant decor at issue
in the Supreme Court's decision to be a kind of product configuration. The Eighth Circuit
also rejected the Third Circuit's suggestion that the Abercrombie & Fitch approach (which
evaluates the relationship between the alleged indication of origin and the product) would
not work in product configuration trade dress because the alleged indication of origin is
the product. The court explained that "because a product's trade dress is not the entire
product itself, but specific features of the product, we find no difficulty in looking at a
specific feature of a product and determining whether and to what degree that feature is
dictated by the nature of the product." Id. at 788.
81. Id.
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on an alleged indication of origin's likely impact on consumers in
evaluating its inherent distinctiveness. The likely impact on
consumers is surely the ultimate question to be determined. The tests
the Eighth Circuit espoused, which examine the relationship of the
alleged trade dress to the product, or the relationship of the alleged
trade dress to other trade dress in the same field, are surely directed
to answering that ultimate question. Essentially, the arbitrary
relationship of a mark or trade dress to the product it identifies, and
the uniqueness of the mark or trade dress in a particular field of
product are both a form of circumstantial evidence that may allow
one to assume that consumers will recognize the mark or trade dress
as an indication of origin. That being the case, the Duraco (and, for
that matter, the Knitwaves) approach can be viewed as simply an
alternative way to evaluate the same ultimate question.
One might likewise question the Eighth Circuit's assertion that
examination of a trade dress' likely impact on consumers essentially
imposes a secondary meaning requirement. The distinctiveness
requirement is intended to ensure that a § 43(a) plaintiff's mark or
trade dress indicates the source of the product to consumers, so that it
merits protection against competitors' simulation. When the mark or
trade dress is inherently distinctive, we assume that consumers will
attach a source-indicating meaning to it. When the mark or dress is
not inherently distinctive, we cannot make that assumption. Thus we
require the plaintiff, through imposition of the secondary meaning
requirement, to prove that consumers actually understand its mark or
dress to indicate the product's origin. The difference between a
finding of inherent distinctiveness and a finding of distinctiveness due
to secondary meaning is the difference between finding what
consumers are likely to think and finding what they do think. That
distinction remains the same, whether one applies the Abercrombie &
Fitch approach or the Duraco (or the Knitwaves) approach to
determining inherent distinctiveness.
Whether or not the Duraco and Knitwaves approaches are
consistent with Two Pesos is a more difficult question. However, the
Eighth Circuit seemed to read too much into Two Pesos. While the
Supreme Court's decision may fairly be read to say that all kinds of
trade dress theoretically may be inherently distinctive, and that all §
43(a) trade dress proprietors should have the opportunity to prove
inherent distinctiveness and avoid the secondary meaning
requirement, it stretches the opinion too far to say that it approved
the Abercrombie & Fitch test for inherent distinctiveness to the
exclusion of all others, or that it mandated that the same test for
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distinctiveness be applied to all forms of trade dress. The correctness
of the lower court's finding of inherent distinctiveness was not before
the Court, and the Court assumed, without deciding, that that finding
was correct. 82 The only issue was whether inherently distinctive trade
dress could be protected in the absence of a showing of secondary
meaning. 83 Since the lower court had applied the Abercrombie &
Fitch classification approach, and that approach was the prevailing
test for inherent distinctiveness at the time, it seems logical that the
Court should refer to it in the course of its discussion. The Court had
no occasion to consider whether an alternative test for inherent
distinctiveness, tailored to a specific type of unregistered trade dress,
would be appropriate.
It is interesting to note, however, what the Two Pesos Court had
to say about the effect of trade dress protection on competition. The
Court stressed that trademarks and trade dress serve the same
purpose-enhancing competition by securing business' consumer
good will from competitors' poaching.84 The Court reasoned that
imposing a secondary meaning requirement on inherently distinctive
trade dress would make it harder for businesses to secure their
business good will against theft, and thus would undermine
competition and frustrate accomplishment of the Lanham Act's
purpose. 85 One might argue that adopting a more stringent test for
inherent distinctiveness, as the Duraco and Knitwaves courts appear
to have done, may have the same effect, insofar as it requires more
businesses to demonstrate secondary meaning prior to enjoying §
43(a) protection for their product configurations.
Moreover, the Two Pesos Court considered and rejected an
argument that, absent a secondary meaning requirement, "the initial
user of any shape or design [could] cut off competition from products
of like design and shape." 86 The Court noted that the functionality
requirement "serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by
the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses." 87 This
discussion suggests that the Supreme Court may discount one of the
chief concerns that has motivated the Third and Second Circuits in
adopting their special standards for evaluating the inherent
distinctiveness of product configuration trade dress. It might be read
82. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 773.
85. Id. at 772.
86. Id. at 774-75.
87. Id. at 775.
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to suggest that all such concerns should be confined to the
functionality determination. However, since the appropriate standard
for evaluating the distinctiveness of product configurations was not
before the Court, the discussion is only suggestive of the Court's
attitude, at best.
The Supreme Court will ultimately need to address the split
between the Eighth Circuit and the Second and Third Circuits, and
clarify the role that concerns about competition should play in the
assessment of inherent distinctiveness of product configuration trade
dress. Is it necessary to impose a different, or more stringent standard
for inherent distinctiveness in the case of product configurations in
order to achieve compatibility with patent policy, or should
competition concerns that arise in such cases be addressed primarily
in the context of the functionality requirement?
It is interesting to note that the Eighth Circuit's functionality
standard is more stringent than the Third and Second Circuits' and
would eliminate from protection many of the same product features
that the Third and Second Circuits would eliminate through their
standards for inherent distinctiveness. In a recent decision, the Eighth
Circuit described its functionality standard as follows:
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product, the interests in free competition
permit... its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. On
the other hand, where the feature, or more aptly, design, is a mere
arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily
adopted for purposes of identification and individuality, and hence,
unrelated to basic consumer demand in connection with the
product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite showing of
distinctiveness is made. Under such circumstances, since effective
competition may be undertaken without imitation, the law grants
protection. Thus, trade dress is nonfunctional "if it is an arbitrary
embellishment primarily adopted for purposes of identification and
individuality."a
As noted above, this standard appears to be stricter, on its face,
than the more general "availability of alternatives" standard for
functionality adopted by the Second Circuit, or the "significantly
related to the utility of the article" standard adopted by the Third.89
The Eighth Circuit's functionality standard appears to do much of
what the Second and Third Circuits were attempting to do in their
standards for distinctiveness: confine trade dress protection to
product features primarily adopted for the purpose of identification,
88. Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 673 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
89. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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and eliminate features that are likely to be desirable to consumers for
reasons other than producer identification, whether the features are
"utilitarian" in nature or not. If this more stringent functionality
standard were generally applied, it would perhaps alleviate the
perceived need to tighten the distinctiveness standard, as has been
done in the Second and Third Circuits. However, one might conclude
that the result achieved in the Second and Third Circuits is a better
one because it provides greater flexibility: when the product features
at issue are not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the
product, and/or there are alternative features available to
competitors, perhaps the interests of competition are better served
overall by a rule that permits § 43(a) protection when the claimant is
able to demonstrate secondary meaning. When secondary meaning
exists, the interest in protection may outweigh the potential injury
that protection of the product features would pose for competitors.
Assuming a less restrictive functionality standard than the
Eighth Circuit employs, it makes sense for courts to use the
functionality and distinctiveness standards together to achieve the
proper competitive balance and avoid conflict with patent policy. The
functionality requirement may be characterized as playing the leading
role in protecting competition in § 43(a) cases, identifying and
absolutely refusing protection for those product features that are
most essential to competitors-those that lack adequate alternatives
or that are significantly related to the utilitarian purpose of the
product. The distinctiveness requirement may then be characterized
as serving as a further refinement in product configuration cases.
Under Congress' patent and copyright regime, even those7 features
that are not essential to competitors are better left in the public
domain if they serve any significant purpose other than source
identification. In such cases, protection against copying should be
reserved only for those features for which secondary meaning, and
thus clear injury to business good will, can be demonstrated. The
Duraco test, in particular, seems well tailored to accomplish this two-
step approach to fine-tuning the balance between competition and
legitimate § 43(a) protection of business good will concerns.
However, both the Duraco and the Second Circuit's Knitwaves
approach can be characterized as undertaking this goal.
The justification of the Second and Third Circuits' approach, of
course, rests in large part on the legitimacy of these Courts'
assumption that: 1) protection of product configuration trade dress in
fact imposes a significantly greater burden on competition than does
protection of other types of indications of origin; and 2) that this
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requires greater emphasis on competition concerns in the
distinctiveness determination. While these assumptions have been
questioned, 90 they seem rational, in the absence of empirical evidence
to the contrary.
III
The Likelihood of Confusion Issue
The third element of a § 43(a) product configuration trade dress
cause of action requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant's use of
a product configuration similar to the plaintiff's causes a likelihood of
consumer confusion about the source, sponsorship or affiliation of
the parties' goods. Here, too, some of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
have differentiated product configurations from other types of indicia
of origin in the interest of protecting the competitive scheme
Congress created under the patent and copyright laws. Again, the
Third Circuit has led the way.
In Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co.,91 the plaintiff manufactured
and sold directional control valves used in control panels of offshore
oil-drilling rigs. It claimed that the contoured lines and shaping of its
valve were distinctive and non-functional, and that the defendant's
intentional marketing of a valve with similar lines and shaping lead to
the requisite § 43(a) likelihood of confusion.9z The district court held
that the plaintiff's product configuration was distinctive and
nonfunctional, and found that the plaintiff had made the necessary
showing of likelihood of confusion.93 On appeal, the Third Circuit
expressed "misgivings" about the district court's distinctiveness and
functionality findings, but held it unnecessary to address them
specifically because the district court's findings on the likelihood of
confusion issue were clearly erroneous. 94
90. See Dratler, supra note 57. Professor Dratler argues that "no great changes in
existing trade dress doctrine are required in order to accommodate product configurations
as trade dress," and that there is "no need for an abrupt tightening of the evolving
standards for inherent distinctiveness." Id. at 594. He argues that proper application of
existing standards of distinctiveness, coupled with the functionality doctrine and
likelihood of confusion analysis and judicious tailoring of remedies, will maintain the
proper balance of competition and protection, and avoid undue conflict with patent
policy. Id. at 595. He contends that altering the standard for determining inherent
distinctiveness in product configuration cases will only lead to "confusion and uncertainty
and thereby open the floodgates of litigation even wider." Id.
91. 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 198.
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In evaluating the likelihood of confusion, the Third Circuit
turned to the ten factors normally used in that Circuit for evaluating
the likelihood of confusion in trademark and § 43(a) cases:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the
alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of [the] owner's mark; (3)
the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the
length of time [the] defendant has used the mark without evidence
of actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in
adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7)
whether the goods, though not in competition, are marketed
through the same channels of trade and advertised through the
same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sale
efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds
of the public because of the similarity of function; (10) other facts
suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner
to manufacture a product in the defendant's market.
95
These factors are substantively very similar to those used in the
other Circuits.96 In Versa, the Third Circuit made it clear that these
95. Id. at 202 (citations omitted).
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 21-23 (1995). In
relying on these ten factors, the court expressly rejected the district court's finding that a
lower, "possibility of confusion" standard was applicable in the Versa case. The Third
Circuit had adopted this lower standard in cases in which the plaintiff was well established
in the market, and the defendant was a "Johnny-come-lately copier." Versa, 50 F.3d at
200-201. According to the court, the primary reasons for lowering the measure of
confusion in such cases were (1) the general lack of legitimate reasons for copying the first
user's mark; and (2) the high degree of reliance by consumers on trademarks as indicators
of the source of products. In rejecting the lower standard for product configuration trade
dress, the Third Circuit noted:
Whether or not these considerations translate to the realm of product
packaging, we think that with respect to product configurations the significance
of each of the factors is greatly diminished.
First, the mere copying of product configurations does not suggest that the
copier was necessarily trying to capitalize on the good will of the source of the
original product. A presumption to the contrary would be mandated, if ever, only
in the narrow class of cases where both (1) a product configuration is desirable to
consumers primarily because of the configuration's inherent or acquired
identification with the original source, and (2) the copier adopts affirmatively
misleading labeling and/or marketing for the copied product.
Second, although a product's trade dress in the form of its configuration
could function as an indicator of the product's source, product configurations in
general are not reliable as source indicators, for functional configurations are not
protected and thus may be freely copied and inherently distinctive configurations
will be rare. Since substantially identical products are often sold by different
manufacturers under different names, consumers are accustomed to relying on
product packaging and trademarks to identify product sources. Indeed, if any
modification of the likelihood of confusion standard is justified in the product
configuration context, the standard might well be heightened, perhaps to a "high
probability of confusion." Nevertheless, we see no need to adopt such a standard
today, preferring for now merely to reject the "possibility of confusion" standard
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factors should not be applied to product configurations in the same
manner as they are applied to trade marks and packaging trade dress.
In particular, the court noted that under the first factor, a strong
similarity of appearance should not carry the same kind of weight in
product configuration trade dress cases as it traditionally has in
trademark and packaging trade dress cases:
Unlike in trademark or product packaging trade dress cases.... a
finding of substantial similarity of trade dress in a product
configuration does not by itself strongly suggest a likelihood of
confusion. Consumers have grown accustomed to relying on
trademarks as trustworthy indicators of the source of the product:
that is the point of a trademark. Perhaps to a somewhat lesser
extent, consumers also rely on other aspects of product packaging
to identify the manufacturer.
In a product configuration trade dress infringement case, by
contrast, consumers do not have to rely on a potentially distinctive
configuration to identify the source of the product; rather, they can
generally look to the packaging, trademarks, and advertising used
to market the product, which are typically much less ambiguous.
Consumers therefore have less need, and so are much less likely, to
rely on a product configuration as an indicator of the product's
source. Accordingly, they are less likely to be confused as to the
sources of two products with substantially similar configurations.
Thus, in trade dress infringement suits where the dress inheres in a
product configuration, the primary factors to be considered in
assessing likelihood of confusion are the product's labeling,
packaging, and advertisements ....
Indeed, except where consumers ordinarily exercise virtually no
care in selecting a particular type of product (as may be the case
with inexpensive disposable or consumable items . . .), clarity of
labeling in packaging and advertising will suffice to preclude almost
all possibility of consumer confusion as to source stemming from
the product's configuration. 97
The Versa court's reasoning might strike one as problematic on
first blush: before reaching the issue of confusion, a court must have
found that the plaintiff's product configuration is distinctive. By
definition, a finding of distinctiveness is a finding that consumers do
or are likely to understand the product configuration to be an
indication of the product's origin. If the Versa court meant to suggest
for product configuration infringement cases, and adhering to the conventional
"likelihood of confusion" standard.
Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
97. Versa, 50 F.3d at 202-03 (footnotes omitted). The Versa court also suggested that
the more expensive or important the product, and the more sophisticated the consumer,
the more likely the consumer will rely on trademarks and packaging, as opposed to
product configuration, to identify the source of the product. Id. at 204-05.
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that consumers will not view the product configuration as an
indication of origin, it was undercutting and discounting the earlier
distinctiveness finding. However, it is more likely that the Third
Circuit meant to say that while consumers may view a product's
configuration as an indication of origin, they are likely to rely more
heavily on other indications, such as trademarks and packaging.
Therefore, to the extent that these alternative sources of information
make the source clear, they should be viewed as outweighing the
potentially confusing impact of a similar product configuration.
In line with the latter construction, the Versa court held that the
second factor-strength of plaintiff's mark98-should only count in
favor of a likelihood of confusion if consumers rely on the product's
configuration to identify the producer of the good. A mere showing
that large numbers of consumers are able to identify the
configuration as coming from a particular source should not be
deemed sufficient.99 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
"sanction too much reliance by consumers on product designs that,
lacking the protection of a patent, are in large measure copyable at
will."100 Thus, "courts should require evidence of actual reliance by
consumers on a particular product configuration as a source indicator
before crediting that configuration's 'strength' toward likelihood of
confusion." 101
Finally, the Versa court questioned the appropriateness of
considering the fifth factor, the defendant's intent, in product
configuration trade dress cases. The court noted that in the Third
Circuit, it is the defendant's intent to confuse, not a mere intent to
copy, that is generally considered probative of the likelihood of
confusion issue. Evidence that the defendant intended to confuse
98. The strength of plaintiff's, mark factor operates on the assumption that
widespread and immediate consumer recognition of the plaintiff's mark as an indication
of the origin of the product enhances the likelihood that the defendant's use of a similar
mark will confuse consumers. Id. at 203.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citations omitted)
101. Id. at 204. The court offered no explanation of what that evidence should be. One
might conclude that the court was requiring a showing much along the lines of that
required for demonstrating secondary meaning. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
However, in evaluating the particular facts at issue in the Versa case, the court stressed
that purchasers ordered the parties' respective valves by multi-digit part and model
numbers peculiar to the manufacturer, specifying functional specifications listed in
schematic diagrams, specification sheets, and manufacturers' catalogues, rather than
specifying the desired appearance of the valve. This suggests that the court would look to
objective facts surrounding typical purchases for circumstantial evidence of consumer
reliance.
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consumers gives rise to an inference that it succeeded in its
undertaking. The court observed that in trademark or packaging
trade dress cases, the inference can be justified because it serves as a
deterrent. However, in the case of product configurations, deterrence
is not an appropriate goal, as long as the defendant has provided
"appropriate labeling and marketing."'102 The court explained:
Where product configurations are concerned, we must be
especially wary of undermining competition. Competitors have
broad rights to copy successful product designs when those designs
are not protected by (utility or design) patents. It is not unfair
competition for someone to trade off the good will of a product, it is
only unfair to deceive consumers as to the origin of one's goods and
thereby trade off the good will of a prior producer.
Unless very narrowly tailored, deterrents to copying of product
designs-as opposed to product packaging or trademarks-would
inhibit even fair competition, thus distorting the Lanham Act's
purpose. We believe that the best way to further Congress' intent is
to limit carefully the scope of any possible deterrence of
competition. 1°3
Thus, the court held that "in the product configuration context, a
defendant's intent weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of
confusion only if intent to confuse or deceive is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence, and only where the product's labeling
and marketing are also affirmatively misleading.'' 104 This limitation
on evidence of the defendant's intent should have a significant
impact, since there is often evidence of intentional copying of the
product in § 43(a) product configuration cases, and, absent
constraints, it may be relatively easy to argue for an inference of an
intent to confuse from an intent to copy. 10 5
102. Versa, 50 F.3d at 206-07.
103. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 208. But cf. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 258 (5th
Cir. 1997) (holding that district court was reasonable in finding that the defendant
intentionally copied the plaintiff's product configuration and in inferring a likelihood of
confusion from this unlawful intent).
The Versa court also noted that factors seven through ten-whether the parties
market and advertise their goods through similar channels, the extent to which the targets
of the parties' sales efforts are the same, the relationship of the goods in the minds of the
public because of the similarity of function, and other facts suggesting that the consuming
public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's
market-should be treated as necessary but insufficient conditions in themselves for
showing a likelihood of confusion. Versa, 50 F.3d at 208.
105. Indeed, some jurisdictions routinely presume an intent to confuse from an intent
to copy. See e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Intent
to copy in itself creates a rebuttable presumption of likelihood of confusion."); Perfect Fit
Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980). In Perfect Fit, the
Second Circuit noted:
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The Versa court justified all of the limitations discussed above on
the reasoning that "the penumbra of the federal patent laws restricts
the degree to which courts may grant legal recognition of consumer
reliance on product configurations as source indicators." 106 The court
stressed the federal policy "of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."'10 7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has voiced similar
concerns about the potential conflict between product configuration
trade dress protection and patent policy, and has cited Versa with
apparent approval for the proposition that the "most important
factors in evaluating confusion in product configuration cases are
marketing and labeling of products."' 08 Likewise, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has cited Versa with apparent approval
for the proposition that consumers are less likely to rely on product
configurations as a source identifier. Thus, "clarity of labeling in
packaging and advertising will suffice to preclude almost all
possibility of consumer confusion as to source stemming from the
product's configuration.' 10 9
The proposition that consumers are more likely to -rely on
labeling and packaging than on product features to identify the
source of the product makes sense. 110 It also provides some
In assessing the likelihood of confusion to the public, an important factor is
whether or not the second comer created the similar trade dress intentionally. If
there was intentional copying the second comer will be presumed to have
intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and will be presumed to
have succeeded.
Id. at 954.
106. Versa, 50 F.3d at 204.
107. Id. at 204 (quotations and citations omitted). For arguments that these concerns
about product configuration trade dress protection interfering with patent law may be
overstated, see Dratler, supra note 57.
108. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376,381,383-84 (7th Cir. 1996).
109. Sunbeam, 123 F.3d at 259. It is interesting to note, however, that the Fifth Circuit
qualified this remark: "While we have recognized that labels may dispel consumer
confusion, under appropriate circumstances, we have never held that this is an absolute
affirmative defense to every trademark infringement claim. To the contrary, we have also
observed that the mere labeling of a product will not automatically alleviate a likelihood
of confusion." Id. In Sunbeam, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the
defendant's electric mixer infringed the plaintiff's distinctive mixer configuration,
notwithstanding proper labeling and packaging.
See also Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 383 (Second Circuit states that proper
identification of the manufacturer in labels and catalogs makes confusion improbable,
notwithstanding similar product configurations).
110. It would, of course, be helpful to have some empirical evidence that supported
the court's assumptions about consumer perceptions and reliance. Studies on this issue,
however, do not seem to be readily available. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
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reassurance that, when courts heighten standards for analyzing
likelihood of confusion in product configuration cases to assure
compatibility with the. patent laws, the purposes of trade dress
protection will not be compromised. The only difficulty with this
rationale is that it assumes that consumers will have the opportunity
to see the product labeling and packaging along with the product
configuration. This will generally (though not always) be the case
when consumers purchase the product. However, it may not be the
case at other times, and in recent years the courts have expanded the
reach of trademark and trade dress protection well beyond the point
of sale, to prevent consumer confusion both before and after a
purchase.111
Thus, one can well imagine a case in which the purchaser of one
of plaintiff's products relies on the plaintiff's label and packaging in
making his purchase, but then removes the label and packaging in
order to use the product. At that point, other persons, who are
potential purchasers of the product, see the product in use, form a
favorable opinion of it, and go to the store to purchase it for
themselves. They have only the distinctive, non-functional product
configuration to rely on as an indication of origin. They are confused
by the defendant's similar product configuration, and think that the
defendant's product comes from the same source as the product they
saw in use and intended to buy. The defendant's clear labeling and
packaging will do nothing to notify them that they are not purchasing
that product. In the same vein, a plaintiff might argue that potential
consumers seeing the defendant's unpackaged product in use might
form negative impressions of it, and attribute their negative
impressions to plaintiff because of the similar configuration. This
would injure plaintiff's reputation and future sales, and is the kind of
injury § 43(a) is meant to address. 112
the court may justify its conservative approach as dictated by concerns about interference
with patent policy.
111. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987)
(pre-sale confusion); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.,2d 867 (2d
Cir. 1986) (post-sale confusion).
112. See, e.g., Payless Shoe Source, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985 (C.A.F.C.
1995); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabricke Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235
(6th Cir. 1991); Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d 867.
In addition, a plaintiff might invoke the "initial interest" or "pre-sale" confusion
doctrine, which holds that a competitor may not lure potential customers away from the
plaintiff by initially passing off its goods as those of the plaintiff, even though confusion
about the source of the goods will be dispelled by the time any sales are made. Such "bait
and switch" tactics may allow the competitor to make its pitch to consumers when it
would not otherwise have had the opportunity to do so, and thus take sales from the
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The Seventh Circuit encountered a form of post-sale confusion
argument in a recent product configuration case, but was able to
avoid it by finding it unsupported by the evidence. 13 The Eighth
Circuit, true to its view that all indications of origin must be treated
alike, has recently found infringement of product configuration trade
dress on a showing of a likelihood of post-sale confusion." 4 After the
Versa decision, one wonders what the Third Circuit will do when it is
squarely faced with a well-made post-sale confusion argument."' A
post-sale confusion argument has the potential to circumvent much of
plaintiff. However, in Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382., the Seventh Circuit addressed an
"initial interest" confusion argument in a product configuration case and rejected it. The
court noted that, in the context of the industrial machine at issue, "the typical consumer
will not assume that the two manufacturers are associated in some way. Rather, where
product configurations are at issue, consumers are generally more likely to think that a
competitor has entered the market with a similar product." Id. (citing Versa, 50 F.3d at
189).
113. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1995). In Libman, the
plaintiff claimed rights in a color scheme for brooms in which one vertical band or
segment of bristles was a color that contrasted with the color of the other bristles. The
defendant marketed brooms with a somewhat similar contrasting stripe in its bristles. The
defendant packaged its brooms in a manner that did not completely cover the contrasting
stripe, but made it unlikely that consumers would notice the stripe. There was no evidence
that the wrapper was ever removed before sale to consumers. Moreover, the parties'
labels and brand names were different, and the defendant did not display its contrasting
bristle scheme in its advertising.
The plaintiff argued that confusion might arise in the following way: Most outlets
only sell one brand of broom, so that there is little opportunity for consumers to do a side-
by-side comparison of the parties' brooms. A consumer who purchased plaintiff's broom
would remove the label upon use and might not remember the brand name. When the
broom was spent, the satisfied customer might seek to purchase another from the same
producer, having only the memory of the broom's appearance to rely on as an indication
of origin. Upon encountering defendant's broom in a store, and having no sample of
plaintiff's with which to compare, the consumer might purchase defendant's broom
believing it to be plaintiffs.' The court found this to be a "plausible narrative," but
rejected it on the ground that no evidence had been supplied to support it. Id. at 1363.
114. Insty*Bit, 95 F.3d at 663. Insty*Bit involved the configuration of quick-change
drill chucks and related accessories. The plaintiff sold its drill chucks and accessories
under its own label and also permitted their sale under the "private label" of several
national distributors of woodworking products. The defendant sold its similar appearing
drill chucks and accessories with different trademarks and packaging, which lead the
district court to find that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion. The Eighth
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgement to the defendant, expressly finding that
"the likelihood of post-sale confusion may be considered in trade dress infringement
actions." Id. at 672. It noted that the plaintiff had "demonstrated that consumers are often
first exposed to its products in use (that is, outside of the package) and then go to a
distributor to find these tools by attempting to match the products on the shelves with the
ones they are seeking." Id.
115. Interestingly, the Third Circuit has never expressly adopted the post-sale
confusion rationale. See generally Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Libengood, 1997 WL
726266 (D.N.J. 1997).
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the Third Circuit's reasoning in Versa, and open the door to much
broader trade dress protection for product configurations than what
the Versa opinion appeared to envision.
One might respond to post-sale confusion arguments by noting
that in many cases, consumers encountering unlabeled, unpackaged
products in use are forming opinions about the type of product, rather
than the product's source. Their determination to purchase or refrain
from purchase based on their experience thus reflects consumer good
will toward the product, rather than consumer good will toward the
product's source.116 Section 43(a) is only meant to protect the good
will that the plaintiff enjoys as the source of a satisfactory product,
not the good will in the product itself, which others may freely take
by copying.117 This argument, of course, rests at least in part on the
assumption that consumers are accustomed to encountering similar-
appearing products from multiple sources, and will not automatically
assume that all similar-appearing products come from the same
source. This is an assumption that the Third Circuit seems willing to
make." 8
116. While this distinction between good will for the product and good will for the
source may be a difficult one to make, the Third Circuit itself made it in the Versa case.
The Third Circuit noted:
Competitors have broad rights to copy successful product designs when those
designs are not protected by (utility or design) patents. It is not unfair
competition for someone to trade off the good will of a product; it is only unfair
to deceive consumers as to the origin of ones' goods and thereby trade off the
good will of a prior producer.
Versa, 50 F.3d at 207 (citations omitted). See also Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445 (exploiting the
"goodwill of the article-the attractive features, of whatever nature, that the product
holds for consumers-is robust competition; only deceiving consumers, or exploiting the
good will of another producer, is unfair competition.").
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118. The Versa court made this clear in its response to the plaintiff's "private labeling"
theory, which would likewise have allowed the plaintiff to circumvent the defendant's
different labeling and packaging. The district court had held that, due to the similarity of
the plaintiff's and defendant's products, persons in the industry might reasonably assume
that the plaintiff had manufactured but privately labelled the defendant's valve. The Third
Circuit acknowledged that § 43(a) protects against false suggestions that the parties or
their goods are related through private labeling. However, it found that the district court's
inference would "potentially subject any new competitor with a product whose
appearance resembles that of an established product to an injunction on this private
labeling theory." The court noted that it had not been presented with evidence that
private labeling occurs "on a scale significant enough to justify such a sweeping extension
of the law of unfair competition." Moreover:
[w]here product configurations are at issue, consumers are not generally
likely to jump to the "private labeling" conclusion; consider for example Oreo
and Hydrox brand sandwich cookies, which are strikingly similar in appearance.
Consumers would not have assumed upon later emergence of one brand that the
first producer had marketed a slight variation of its cookie under a private label.
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The Third Circuit might also respond that trade dress law should
not attempt to prevent every conceivable possibility of consumer
confusion. Given the rather speculative nature of many post-sale
confusion arguments, concerns about undermining patent law should
generally outweigh concerns about potential post-sale confusion-
especially when the defendant has taken proper measures to ensure
that its labeling and packaging themselves create no confusion. There
is certainly precedent for ignoring certain cases of likely confusion in
product configuration cases-the law tolerates potential consumer
confusion in the interest of competition when competitors copy
functional product features. 9 Nonetheless, a general rejection of
post-sale confusion arguments in product configuration cases would
be a controversial step, and contrary to the general trend of more
readily accepting post and pre-sale confusion arguments. 120
IV
Conclusion
Clearly the Supreme Court's opinion in the Two Pesos case has
not dispelled concern in the Circuit Courts about the anticompetitive
potential of § 43(a) trade dress protection for product configurations.
The level of any particular Circuit Court's concern may be related at
least in part to the stringency of the functionality standard that
Circuit has adopted. The Second and Third Circuits, in particular,
have made it clear that they will cast a critical eye on product
configuration claims to ensure that § 43(a) does not become a
substitute for patent or copyright protection for product features and
does not undermine Congress' purpose in enacting the patent and
copyright laws. These Circuits will not rely on their functionality
doctrines alone in doing this. They have adopted restrictive standards
for inherent distinctiveness in product configuration cases, and the
Third Circuit has adopted special restrictions in assessing the
Rather, as in situations like the present one, consumers generally are more likely
to conclude, quite reasonably, that a competitor has entered the market with a
substantially identical product.
Versa, 50 F.3d at 215. The court also rejected arguments that because the defendant was
not known in the American market, valve purchasers might assume that plaintiff had
manufactured the defendant's valve but was selling it under a private label: "A rule
sanctioning this inference would tend to strangle competition by adopting what is in
essence a presumption that consumers will believe an established business has a greater
market share than it really does." Id. at 216.
119. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
120. See generally 3 J.T MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23[6] (1997).
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likelihood of confusion posed by defendants' copying of product
features. Some of the other Circuits have expressed sympathy for this
approach.
This trend will be curtailed only by new legislation or by a
Supreme Court decision that directly confronts the Circuit Courts'
concerns about competition and mandates that § 43(a) product
configuration trade dress claims be treated under the same
standards-across the board-as claims involving other indications of
origin. It is by no means clear that such a Supreme Court decision will
come. The Supreme Court has expressed its concern, in a series of
supremacy clause decisions, about the potential for state unfair
competition rights in product features to conflict with federal patent
policy.121 Judicial extension of § 43(a) protection to product
configuration trade dress claims poses some of the same problems.
The Court's more recent opinion in Two Pesos does not purport to
provide a full or final resolution of the dilemma.
Nor is recently proposed legislation likely to resolve the conflict.
Representative Coble, Chair of the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, recently
introduced a bill1 22 "intended to clarify the law with respect to the
applicable legal standards for the protection of trade dress." 123 The
bill defines both inherent distinctiveness and functionality for trade
dress. However, the proposed definitions are too general to have the
desired effect of unifying the law among the Circuits.
First, the bill would amend Lanham Act § 2124 to state that trade
dress will be protected without the need of demonstrating secondary
meaning if "the relevant public is likely to identify the source of the
product or service by reference to the subject matter claimed as trade
dress." 125 The bill provides four non-exclusive factors that should be
considered in making the inherent distinctiveness determination:
1) whether the trade dress is unique or unusual in the particular
field to which the subject matter pertains;
121. See Sears, 376 U.S. 225; Compco, 376 U.S. 234; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141.
122. Trade Dress Protection Act, H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (1998).
123. 144 CONG. REC. E117 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1996). This definition would undoubtedly extend to § 43(a)
trade dress claims, as well. See Two Pesos, 112 S.Ct. at 2757 ("it is common ground that §
43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles
qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under §
43(a).").
125. H.R. 3163 § 2(a)(3), 105th Cong. (1998).
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2) whether the trade dress comprises a common basic shape or
design;
3) whether the trade dress is a mere refinement of commonly
adopted and well known forms of ornamentation for that
particular class of goods or services viewed by the public as a
dress or ornamentation for the goods or services; and
4) whether the trade dress is capable of creating a commercial
impression distinct from any accompanying words.
126
This provision would notify the Eighth Circuit that a trade dress'
likely impact on consumers is the relevant consideration in evaluating
inherent distinctiveness. 127 However, it is unlikely to do much else.
The four non-exclusive factors simply restate the Seabrook Farms test
verbatim,128 and, as discussed above, the Second, Third, and Eighth
Circuits all purport to include the Seabrook Farms test as part of their
otherwise divergent standards for inherent distinctiveness. 129 The
bill's express statement that its four factors are non-exclusive would
leave the Circuits to continue along the respective paths they selected
in the Duraco, Knitwaves, and Stuart Hall decisions.Representative Coble's bill would codify the functionality
requirement for the first time, 130 and amend Lanham Act § 45131 to
provide that trade dress is functional if it is "of such superior design
for its purpose that to afford it protection under this Act would
significantly hinder effective competition." The bill provides three
non-exclusive factors to be considered in making this determination:
1) whether the matter yields a competitive advantage;
2) whether alternative designs are available; and
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 78, 125 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In Seabrook Farms, the court provided
the following factors for determining whether a design is inherently distinctive:
Whether [the design] was a "common basic shape or design," whether it was unique
or unusual in a particular field, whether it was a mere refinement of a commonly-
adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods
viewed by the public as dress or ornamentation for the goods, or whether it was
capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words.
Seabrook Foods, 568 F.2d at 1344 (citations omitted).
129. See supra notes 69, 53-54, 78, and accompanying text.
130. H.R. 3163 §§ 2(a)(1), (b), (c), (d). The bill would also clarify that persons
claiming trade dress infringement under Lanham Act § 43(a) bear the burden of proving
that their trade dress is nonfunctional. Id. § 2(d). See supra note 21, and accompanying
text.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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3) whether the matter achieves economies in the manufacture
or use of the goods or services, or affects their cost or
quality.132
This very broad definition seems consistent with the Supreme
Court's definition of functionality in Qualitex,33 and with most of the
existing decisions in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The bill's three
non-exclusive factors have routinely been cited in the various Circuits
in connection with their differing functionality standards. However,
once again the very general nature of the definition and non-exclusive
factors renders the bill ineffective in unifying the Circuits' varying
approaches to determining functionality: the bill simply does not
address the issues that have divided the Circuits. For example, when
will protection "significantly hinder effective competition?" When
will the purported trade dress "yield a competitive advantage?" Only
when the product features are significantly related to the utilitarian
function of the product, as provided in the Third Circuit? 134 Any time
that the features are not primarily adopted for purposes of
identification, as provided in the Eighth Circuit?135 Moreover,
making the listed factors non-exclusive leaves the Circuits free to
focus on other, additional factors that may further divide them.
It is interesting to note a possible trend toward enhancing
protection against the copying of unpatentable, uncopyrightable
product features in other parts of the world.136 The appropriateness
of this movement is subject to some question.137 However, absent
Supreme Court or Congressional intervention, it seems unlikely that
the United States will join this trend through the vehicle of Lanham
Act § 43(a).
132. H.R. 3163 § 2(c).
133. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design
Protection In the European Union, 24 AIPLA Q. J. 611 (1996).
137. See supra note 13 and the sources cited therein.
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